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INVESTMENT
As long as provident men were content to utilize their savings by putting
them to work in enterprises of their own or of a neighbor, the tissue of the
common law-with the aid of some statutory and judicial mending-could cope
with the problems of investor protection. And there was little cause to question
the relation of savings and investment to the general economic welfare. But
when savings grew and were entrusted to specialized financial institutions, the
traditional processes were put to the test.' Although a large body of financial
law evidences the endeavor, existing regulation of life insurance investment
suggests that efforts have not kept pace with needs. Today, the $,51,500,000,-
000 of life insurance funds 2 present an increasing number of unsolved eco-
nomic and legal problems.
From modern economic theory comes an impressive statement of the im-
portance of insurance investment regulation. As economists came to recog-
nize that full employment and prosperity were fundamentally dependent upon
the stimulus of private investment, vital significance was attributed to life in-
surance funds, the nation's largest private capital pool ;" and the existing regu-
lations governing investment of these funds were seen as a major determinant
of the level and stability of the national economy.4 But judges and legislators
1. See Headley, A Trustee in a World of Changing Values, 5 LAW & CONTt IP.
PROB. 355 (1938); HORTON, SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS (1927);
ZARTMAN, THE INVESTMENTS OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES c. 6 (1906).
2. LIFE INSURANCE AssociATO N OF AMERICA, PROCEEDINGS 39 (41st Annual Meet-
ing, 1947) (hereinafter cited as LIAA, PROCEEDINGS). See note 62 infra. This estimate
relates only to "legal reserve life insurance companies." These companies agree to pay
policyholders a-sum or benefit which cannot be scaled down, and for which is charged a
premium that ordinarily cannot be increased. Such a company is required to establish, in
respect to each policy issued and in force, a reserve as defined by law, constituting a fund
which on the basis of actuarial computation is deemed exactly sufficient to guarantee that
the company will be able to meet its obligations under policy contracts as they fall due.
GESELL AND HoWE, STUDY OF LEGAL RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 5, 11. 1
(TNEC Monograph 28, 1940) (hereafter cited as TNEC Monograph 28). For possible
alternative theories of life insurance see note 78 infra. Other types of life insurance
companies, such as fraternal orders and assessment associations, are not included In this
definition, but account for only about 5 percent of the life insurance in force in the United
States. Ibid. Throughout this entire discussion the term "life insurance companies" refers
only to legal reserve companies as defined above.
3. Life insurance company assets exceed the combined savings deposits of the nation's
mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations by 20 billion dollars, and are al-
most 25 percent greater than the total of time deposits in the nation's commercial banks.
FORTUNE, April, 1948, p. 109.
4. For general economic analysis of the role of capital and savings in a free en-
terprise society see HANSEN, ECONOMIC STABILIZATION IN AN UNBALANCED WORLD
(1932); FISCAL POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES (1941); KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY
OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936); ANGELL, INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS
CYCLES (1941).
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have been refractory students of economics. The patchwork of regulation
they have constructed serves mainly to limit insurance investment to relatively
unproductive debt-financing-a practice which appears both to retard pros-
perity by inhibiting the economic stimulus of insurance capital,0 and to
threaten the ability of insurance companies to invest their funds safely.
To the perplexing economic problems of regulating life insurance invest-
ments must be added a number of unsolved legal issues. Traditionally, the
most persistent of these has been protection of the individual policyholder, for
when large numbers of citizens entrust their savings to private financial insti-
tutions, the state has long been called upon for safeguards against unscrupulous
or unsound investment practices.0  And wealth is a coordinate of power. If
the savings of thousands of individuals are controlled by the management of
large corporations and financial institutions, society encounters the additional
problem of protecting the public from the risks inherent in such concentra-
tion.
7
Fifially, there is increasing interplay between these economic and legal prob-
lems. For economic pressures appear to be forcing insurance investment to
abandon safe and relatively impotent debt-financing, and to enter the field of
equity or ownership investment, which in turn raises the greatest legal prob-
lems of both policyholder and public protection." No easy escape from this
dilemma can be offered. But in view of the vital nature of the issues, and the
complex corrective action which apparently will be required, it is important to
give at least a warning.
See also Report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the State of
New York, Feb. 22, 1906, vols. I to X (special committee of New York legislature, kmown
as the Armstrong committee, appointed to investigate the affairs of life insurance com-
panies) ; TNEC Monograph 28.
5. This problem becomes increasingly more critical as life insurance company assets
grow. In the year 1947, a total of three and one-third billion dollars of new funds were
received to be invested. LIAA, PRGCEEDINGs 41. This increase was more than two and
one-half times the increment in 1937, and almost twice as much as was received by life in-
surance companies in 1941, only 5 years before. Id. at 50. Total life insurance resources
tend to double every 10 years. This accelerating yearly growth has been a characteristic
feature of the life insurance business since its inception, and all present indications point
to a continuation of this trend into the future. See notes 62, 88 infra.
6. ZART AN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 146 if; HuEnNE% Lxiii Ixsua::.cc 549-50
(1935).
7. "It should be easier to achieve the values of democracy in a society where eco-
nomic power and social status are more widely distributed, and less concentrated, than
in the United States today." Rostow, The New Sherman Act, 14 U. or Cur. L Rnv. 567
(1947).
"A commitment to free enterprise is deeply imbedded in public policy. A score of
statutes proclaim a competitive design to which all industrial conduct is expected to con-
form. The Sherman Act, "a charter of freedom" for American business ... is flanked
by the Clayton and the Robinson-Patman Acts .. ." HA-.1LTO:, Ta PATrmni; or
CoisnrroN 6 (1940). For the most e-tensive discourse of governmental interest in
concentration see reports of the Temporary National Economic Committee.
S. See pp. 1273-75 infra.
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THE PATTERN OF STATUTORY CONTROL
Born of dalliance of conservative legal attitude with the Commerce Clause,
the present statutory regulation of life insurance investment betrays its
parentage in both form and substance.9 When the Supreme Court held that
insurance was not commerce, 0 the form of insurance investment regula-
tion was destined to be an amorphous mass of 4911 sovereigns' statutes.
Since the proper role of government control over commerce was gen-
erally viewed to be one of protecting from abuse, the substance of the
insurance investment laws was limited to a body of prohibitions against
the dangers of uncertain or unsound investments." -
Although decentralized regulation of life insurance investment has led to a
large number of regulatory statutes,' 3 little variety in scope has resulted. These
9. Descriptive literature on the life insurance investment statutes is somewhat sparee.
ZARTMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, describes the statutes in force in 1906, giving the histori-
cal development of investment statutes and arguments for their abolition as ineffective.
HOBBS, THE INVESTMENT LAWS RELATING TO INSURANCE COMPANIES (1921) surveys the
statutory scene in 1921. No more recent extended analysis has been discovered, but a
brief summary is contained in TNEC Monograph 28 at 372.
10. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U.S. 1869); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648
(1895). The now famous case of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322
U.S. 533 (1944) declared the insurance business to be interstate commerce whatever its
position within individual states. State regulation now exists by virtue of Congressional
permission, albeit supplemented by various Federal statutes regulating interstate com-
merce. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-4. See American Management Association,
The Implications of Federal Control over Insurance (1946) (Insurance Series No, 6,
1946). There is little question that the life insurance business is predominantly interstate.
The TNEC found that, of the 365 legal reserve life insurance companies in the United
States in 1939, two-thirds, holding 99y2 per cent of all assets, did business in two or
more states. 46 percent of the companies, with 90 percent of assets, operated in five or
more states, and 17 companies with over 75 percent of assets, operated in 40 or more
states. TNEC Monograph 28, 5, 379-81. Today, the 10 largest companies, controlling over
70 percent of all life insurance investments, extend their business into 40 or more states.
MOODY'S MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS, BANKS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, ETC. (1948).
11. The District of Columbia is included as a separate jurisdiction, inasmuch as the
District has its own set of investment statutes. D.C. CODE §§ 35-535, 6 (1940).
12. Legal regulation of insurance investments has been almost purely protective. It
has sought to serve two objectives: to secure the investment of the assets 'in "safe"
securities and to safeguard against careless, incautious or unscrupulous management.
HOBBS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 3, and ZARTMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 178. The only
significant departure from this purity of purpose was the early tendency to confine invest-
ment capital to activities within the home state. ZARTMAN, 151, 161, but few traces of
autarchy remain in the present statutes. See notes 19 and 27 infra, and also the so-
called Robertson law in Texas, VERNON'S TEXAS STATS. §§ 4765-20 (1936), requiring all
companies doing business in Texas to keep 75 percent of the reserves on Texas policies
invested in "Texas securities."
13. Inasmuch as almost every state imposes some degree of investment supervision
upon foreign insurers, most insurance companies are to some degree subject to the con-
trol of several states' statutes. The manner of supervision differs widely: some states
impose express statutory requirements that foreign insurers comply with restrictions im-
posed upon domestic companies; others leave to the discretion of the insurance commis-
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laws in general prescribe seven major types or classes of investments which
may be made-for example, government bonds, mortgages, corporate bonds,
corporate stock-with added provisions defining minimum standards for par-
ticular investments within each class.14 Five of these major classes are se-
cured loans of capital, paying a fixed rate of interest and backed by the faith
and credit of a government or the pledge of security. The general result of
the complete statutory pattern i' may be summarized: to the degree that invest-
ment approaches equity or risk financing, deriving return from profits instead
of interest, it will be increasingly discouraged as an outlet for life insurance
funds.16
Foremost among investments favored for life insurance companies are
government bonds. ObligationsI 7 issued by the United States,18 any state, or
sioner the determination of the soundness of a foreign insurer's investments; and perhaps
the most prevalent practice is for the commissioner to approve investments authorized
by the foreign company's domicile. The variance in these practices, and the discretion
vested in the commissioners render it virtually impossible to evaluate the effect of this
statutory interplay upon investment of total life insurance assets; the net result, however,
is certainly to give primary importance to the regulatory statutes of those few eastern
states in which many of the largest companies are domiciled. See Sotterthwaite, Iwaet-
nents by Life l;mirance Companies in Income Rcal Estato, Izs. L. J. 771 (1947) for
careful'analysis of this statutory interplay in the realm of real estate purchase.
14. Though the general pattern of most of the statutes is of this form, there are of
course numerous minor variations and a few exceptions. Rhode Island has no general
insurance investment statute. Alabama and Florida have no compulsory investment statute
governing funds in excess of $100,000 and '200,000 minimum capital, respectively. A..
CODE Tit. 28, § 70 (1940). FL. STATS. §§ 518.06-.03, 626.04, 626.06 (1941). South
Carolina has no restrictive provision of any kind. The Connecticut statutes are generally
prohibitory in form, rather than authorizing various classes. Comi. GEiN. Srx. § 1269(e)
(Supp. 1939). In the following discussion the statutes are divided according to the seven
major classes and aberrational states are classified according to the apparent status of a
particular investment class under their statutes.
15. Some recent statutory innovations authorize investment of a small percentage of
assets without specific limitation. At least 8 states have passed such statutes, 6 specifying five
percent, one seven and one-half percent, and one 10 percent. Several states do not apply
their statutes to excess reserves or surplus funds. The effect of these statutes cannot be
evaluated in the following discussion.
16. The statutes prescribe limits upon the percentage of assets which may be invested
in certain classes of investments. The pattern of actual investment within these limits is
determined primarily by company officials. ALTMsAN, SAVING, INIESMsENT, AND NATIO::AL
Iqcom 43, 49 (TNEC Monograph 37, 1941) (hereinafter cited as TNEC Monograph 37).
17. Though literal definitions of the obligations which may be purchased vary, the
most general requirements are that they be interest-bearing, direct obligations of the
issuing governments, or secured by its faith and credit. Many statutes also provide for
interest-paying obligations which are guaranteed by authorized agencies of these govern-
ments. These provisions are of importance with respect to the great multitude of govern-
mental agencies, federal, state and local, which are authorized to float securities in order
to finance for example, construction, welfare, or assistance programs of Various types.
18. United States Government Bonds constituted approximately twenty billion dollars
or 39.3 percent of total life insurance reserves at the end of 1947, a decrease of 5.6 percent
during that year, the first such drop since 1930. LIAA, PRocEEDxIos. These bonds have
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the District of Columbia are legal investments in every state ;10 and the obliga-
tions of counties, cities and other political sub-divisions are also generally
eligible. 20  Foreign government bonds, however, have never been allowed to
form a significant part of insurance company portfolios ;21 and in recent years
been the most important of all classes of life insurance holdings during the past two
decades, because of the decline of private investment outlets relative to government ob-
ligations and insurance assets. From 1930 to 1946, holdings of U. S. Governments in-
creased from 300 million dollars, or 1.8 percent of total investments, to 26 billion dollars,
or 44.9 percent. Id. at 44, 48.
19. At the end of 1947, state, county, and municipal bonds constituted 625 million
dollars, or 1.2 percent of total investments. This class of security reached its peak in
1940 at 6.0 percent of total assets, after a steady rise during the depression. After 1940,
however, the volume of state and local bond flotations fell considerably, and their position
in life company portfolios has steadily declined since that time. LIAA, POc.EDINGs 41,
44.
Included in these figures are holdings of obligations of the District of Columbia (al-
most universally authorized) and of territories and possessions of the United States which
are authorized in 31 states.
Except for Idaho and Arkansas, which limit purchases to their own securities, all
states allow purchase of the securities of any state. However, half the states prohibit
purchase of obligations of states which have defaulted on any obligation during a stated
prior period, usually from 5 to 10 years. No state limits the percentage of total assets
which may be invested in federal, state or territorial bonds.
20. Statutes usually define the kinds of governmental units whose securities may be
purchased by a generic provision referring to the obligations of "any civil or political sub-
divisions", but such minor units as townships, school districts, taxing districts, water or
drainage divisions receive frequent specific mention. Only a very few states place any
significant limitation upon the amount of assets that may be invested in such obligations
and these have set the relatively generous figure of 25 percent. An even smaller number
of states confine purchases of local governmental securities to those issued by local units
within their own state boundaries. But other significant limitations are frequent: there
must have been no default on the security or the same flotation; principal and interest
often must be payable from general ad valorem or income taxes; and occasionally, pay-
ment is not allowed to rest on special assessments levied only on property benefitted by
local improvements. Also the ratio of the issuer's debt to total taxable property value must
be below a given minimum, varying from three to 10%; the population must total a
minimum figure, and no default on any outstanding obligations may have occurred within
a specified prior period.
21. Bonds of foreign governments, other than Canada, formed less than one-tenth of
one percent of total insurance investments at the end of 1947; and amounted to
$25,000,000, almost double the volume of such investments at the end of 1946. The 1947
figure represents the first significant reversal in the decreasing trend in this class of
investment since 1906, when this class of investment was in the neighborhood of 65 million
dollars, or two percent of all assets. LIAA, PRocEEDINGs 45, 48.
Recently, a small number of states have allowed purchase of securities of the Ititer-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, an indirect method of foreign invest-
ment. These bonds will undoubtedly receive acceptance by many more states, because they
rest largely on the credit of the United States Government. Edmunds, Outlets for Life
Insurance Investment, 25 HARv. Bus. REv. 409, 424 (1947).
General foreign investments, including those in private enterprises, other than
Canadian securities, are permitted by about one-half of the states, limited generally to
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the only foreign securities purchased have been bonds of the Dominion of
Canada which are permitted in approximately three-quarters of the states.2
Closely resembling the protected position of government bonds, real estate
mortgages23 are similarly favored as life insurance investments -" and are per-
mitted by the statutes of every jurisdiction.25 The only significant restrictions
on these investments limit the amount which may be loaned upon a given parcel
of real estate, usually to tvo-thirds2 of the appraised value, and require that
the mortgage be a first lien.Y
countries in which an insurance company does business. They often may be made only
to the amount required by such country or the amount necessary to cover the company's
obligations upon policies covering lives in such countries, and must be of the classes of
securities authorized for domestic investment. The remainder of the states have no ex-
press provision for foreign investment.
See, for a careful analysis of the future foreign investments as outlets for life in-
surance funds. Id. at 423-424. Except for purchases of bonds of the International Banl;
private loan capital in the United States did not furnish a significant amount of funds for
foreign reconstruction during 1947. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1948, p. 35, col. 4.
22. Bonds of the Dominion and provinces of Canada are given authorization, separate
from other foreign securities, in three-quarters of the states, and are generally made eli-
gible on the same basis, and subject to the same restrictions, as obligations of the United
States or its states. Occasionally, however, the percent of assets that may be invested in
Canadian governments is limited to five or ten percent. Approximately tvwo-thirds of the
states also authorize purchase of evidences of debt of local Canadian governments, on the
same basis as local United States governments.
Canadian corporate and mortgage investments, when authorized, are included in the
statutes dealing with these classes of investments. See notes 27 and 30 infra.
Canadian government bond investments, including political subdivisions, have main-
tained an approimately constant ratio to total assets since the end of 1945 when they
had reached an all time high of 2.6 percent as a result of wartime increases. Such in-
vestments totalled about $1,300,000,000 at the end of 1947, an increase of about 39 million
during the year. LIAA, ProCErNtGs 45, 48.
23. Mortgages, perhaps even more than bonds, fit traditional conceptions of the ideal
life insurance investment: steady, fixed income, long-term and adequately secured.
Moreover, they generally yield a better return than bonds, and in "normal" times, are felt
not to be as subject to market fluctuations. HunNER, op. cit. Mupra note 6, at 530-4, 544,
Edmunds, supra note 21, at 415.
24. At the end of 1947, total nortgage loan investments were approximately $3,575,-
000,000, representing a 29 per cent expansion since the end of the war, and bringing the
mortgage loan ratio to about 16.6% of assets as against 14.8% at the end of 1945. Of this
total 7.7 billion were on non-farm properties, and 875 million were on farm properties.
Until 1945, there had been a steady downward trend in mortgages beginning in the late
1920's, when mortgages constituted over 40 percent of total assets, and accelerating
rapidly during the depression years due to the unprecedented rate of foreclosures. LIAA,
Paoc=DNcGs 43.
25. About 8 states also allow mortgages on long-term leaseholds. It is generally re-
quired that the leasehold have a duration of 50 years or more.
26. This figure is adopted by 30 states, while 10 states limit the amount to 50 percent
of the appraised value, and eight states have figures varying between 50 and 85 percent.
A number of states also provide for variation in the limit, if certain amortization and
duration-of-loan requirements are met.
27. Additional common requirements are that the land be improved or be productive,
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Two remaining classes of secured debt holdings complete the less restricted
classes of life insurance investment. Loans to policy holders, in an amount
equal to the reserve value of the pplicy at the time of the loan, are authorized
in every jurisdiction. 28  In addition, about three-quarters of the states permit
life insurance companies to make loans secured by a pledge of collateral. But
the collateral is required to consist of securities which would be eligible for
direct purchase by the life insurance company, and the amount of the loan is
generally limited to eighty or ninety percent of the value of the pledged
securities.29
Corporate bonds are approved for life insurance company investment in
practically all states, and unsecured corporate obligations, such as debentures
and notes, are permitted by about two-thirds -of the states.80 But instruments
of corporate debt s' are apparently felt t6 share the dangers of equity interests,
but there are few restrictions upon the type of activity which may be conducted upon the
property mortgaged. Of more significance but very infrequent, are limitations on the
amount which may be invested in one mortgage and the percentage of total assets il all
mortgages. The former figure is often two percent of total assets, and the latter may
vary from 40 to 80 percent. Most states permit mortgages on Canadian real estate to be
taken, while the remainder restrict eligible property to land within the United States.
Maine, North Dakota, and Arkansas, however, allow their insurance companies to make
mortgage purchases only on land within the state itself or its immediate neighbors.
An extremely important part of the mortgage loan provisions are the statutes of -4
of the states 'permitting unlimited investments in mortgages and loans insured under the
National Housing Act; and similar laws in one-third of the states regarding the Service-
men's Readjustment Act.
28. Policy loans at the end of 1947 totalled an estimated 1.95 billion dollars, or 3.8
percent of all assets, a slight increase over 1946, the low point in a steady decline from
the 1932 peak of about five billion dollars. LIAA, PROCEEDINGs 45, 49.
Inasmuch as the policyholder pledges his policy contract in exchange for a loan upon
that contract, policy loans are actually riskless investment. Moreover, the interest rate on
these loans, as specified in the policy, is usually extremely favorable to the company.
HUEBNER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 538.
There are several disadvantages, however, to this type of investment. Being made
upon policyholder request, no discretion rests with the company to determine either the
magnitude or the timing of this use of funds. A high proportion of borrowing policy-
holders eventually permit their policies to lapse, instead of repaying the loan. Finally,
policy loans are essentially a disaster credit, sought in times of financial difficulty, and
thus are not a steady investment outlet. See TNEC MONOGRAPH 28, at 366-8; Edmunds,
supra note 21, at 418.
29. This type of investment is of largely academic interest, inasmuch as collateral
loans have been less than one-tenth of one percent of all assets since 1934, and in the
past quarter century have never exceeded two-tenths of one percent. LIAA, PRocmmians
49.
30. The great bulk of these statutes refer to any United States corporation and the
remainder speak of railroad, public utility, and any industrial corporation. During the
past several years life insurance companies have entered the field of private business
term loans which are similar to bank loans, although usually having a longer maturity,
Edmunds, supra note 21, at 420. As their assets continue to grow, life insurance com-
panies may well be expected to increase steadily their activity in this field.
31. Following conventional life insurance investmefit vocabularies, the term "cor-
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for they are subject to a number of restrictions placed on the latter type of
investment. Most important of the restrictions on purchase of these securi-
ties are provisions limiting the percentage of total assets which may be so
invested.3 2 Even within the allowed quota many different types of qualifica-
tions are imposed before individual securities are eligible for purchase. Al-
most all states require that the issuing corporation have maintained substantial
minimum yearly earnings for a prescribed number of years prior to the date of
purchase of the security.m Other frequent restrictions prohibit the purchase
of the bonds or debentures of a corporation which, at any time during a speci-
fied prior period,4 defaulted on the interest or principal of any outstanding
obligation, and a few states make eligible only securities of corporations
whose funded debt is less than a prescribed ratio to its capital stock.3
porate" is used generically to refer to commercial and industrial business activity in
general. A detailed breakdown of these statutes reveals that over one-half of all the
states permit investment in the bonds of any corporation. A second group speaks of the
bonds of any industrial corporation, in addition to railroads and public utilities, and these
two groups together constitute substantially all the states. A very few states authorize
the bonds of railroad and public utility corporations only.
The term "bonds" as used here refers to secured obligations, including both mortgage
and collateral trust bonds. An additional type of secured obligation mentioned in the
statutes of almost every state are railroad equipment trust bonds, secured by mortgage on
rolling stock or equipment for use on United States, and often Canadian, railroads. Only
about 20 states expressly confine corporate investments to those of United States busi-
nesses. The remainder either expressly include Canadian corporations in the statute, or
make no reference to any nation.
32. These limitations, found in over half the states, take tvo forms: A limit upon the
proportion of a company's assets which may be invested in the securities of one corpora-
tion, which varies from one percent to 10 percent; and a limit upon the total assets which
may be invested in-all corporate securities, which varies from 25 to 50 percent. Either or
both types may be found in the statutes of one jurisdiction.
33. The earnings requirements take many different forms, but most commonly pre-
scribe a ratio of earnings to total fixed charges. The required ratio varies from one and
one-fourth to two in the case of railroads and public utilities, and from one and one-fourth
to three for other types of corporations. Other expressions of required earnings may take
the form of a minimum allowable gross earnings, varying from $00,000 to five million
dollars, or of a net earning volume sufficient to pay a stipulated dividend on all capital
stock, ranging from four to six percent.
The measuring period also takes many forms, most common of which is to stipulate
a two to seven year period during which earnings must have averaged the required mini-
mum. Other laws require that the minimum have been earned during each year of the
period, and still others prescribe a combination of these two types.
34. This period is most commonly five years.
35. Typical is a ratio of one to three. This requirement in effect may prevent in-
surance companies from encouraging corporations to assume excessive debt. See note 71
infra. Other restrictions are that the corporation be "solvent," and that the security not
be "speculative." In addition, the obligations of mining and oil companies are occasionally
prohibited.
At the end of 1947, life insurance investments in corporate interest-paying obliga-
tions totalled an estimated $14,550,000,000 or 28.2o of total assets. Of these, 12,6D,-
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Deemed to be radically different in character from investments in the loan
group, the two remaining major classes of investments are corporate stocks
and real estate.3 6 Both of these place the life insurance companies in the
status of "owners," rather than "creditors," and the return from these classes
is received as "profits, rather than interest.' 37 Less favored than any other
000,000 were railroad bonds, $6,640,000,000 were public utility bonds, and $5,140,000,000
were bonds of other types of corporations.
The class of corporate obligations has increased rapidly since the end of the war
period, climbing from an all-time low of approximately 22 percent at the end of 1945.
Investment in corporate obligations rose steadily during the twenties, to a peak of 31%
of total assets in 1930, and then gradually declined until 1945. The greatest change, how-
ever, has been in the distribution of these investments among the three types named above.
Though railroad bonds dominated this group until the early 1920's, their importance has
steadily declined, replaced first by a spurt of public utility securities through the twenties
and thirties, and later, as insurance resources continued to double each decade, by increase
in obligations of other types of corporations. The post war increase has been primarily in
securities of this third group, with some expansion in public utility obligations, and little
change in railroad holdings. LIAA, PR0ComCNas 41-42, 48-51. See also Edmunds, supra
note 21, at 411.
36. Life insurance holdings of corporate stock totalled $1,550,000,000 at the end of
1947, about 3.0% of assets. This was an increase from 2.2% of total assets at the end of
1945. After the Armstrong investigation in 1906, see note 4 supra, life insurance stock
investments dropped from five percent to about two percent and have never exceeded
three percent until the past year. LIAA, PROcEDINGS 42-3, 51. The distribution of stock
holdings among railroad, public utility and other corporations, and the change in that
distribution over the past 25 years, is similar to the distribution and change in the
corporate bond category. See note 35 supra.
Real estate investments should be carefully distinguished from investment in real
estate mortgages. Largely as a result of housing project and commercial real estate in-
vestments during 1947, total real estate investments increased during that year for the
first time since 1936 to a total value of 825 million dollars or 1.6 percent of assets. The
depression years, and consequent foreclosures of mortgages, saw real estate ownership
rise to an all-time high of 8 percent of total assets in 1936, from which it steadily de-
clined until last year. LIAA, PROCEMINGs 43-4.
37. For evidence that the interest-profit, debt-equity distinction may be largely artifi-
cial, see note 80 infra. In addition to the classes of investments discussed in the text, and
the various miscellaneous categories described in note 17 Vupra, several other minor
classes of investments deserve mention. 1) Cash. Though cash holdings receive little
mention in the statutes, life insurance companies are generally permitted to maintain such
cash balances as they see fit. The magnitude of funds held as cash during the thirties
aroused grave fears on the part of the TNEC investigators. TNEC Monograph 28, 355-9,
371-8. See also TNEC Monograph 37, 44, 49-50 and compare STATEMENT o Limn Iu-
suRAcE 9 (TNEC Monograph 28-A, 1941.) (hereinafter cited as TNEC Monograph
28-A). Cash holdings at the end of 1947 totalled 800 million dollars, or 1.6 percent of all
assets. 2) Acceptances and bills of exchange, eligible for purchase by the Federal Reserve
Banks, are authorized in twelve states. 3) Securities acquired pursuant to corporate
reorganizations, or to protect prior corporate investments are eligible in eighteen states.
4) In addition to insured mortgage loans under the N.H.A. and S.R.A., see note 27 supra,
the insured unsecured loans provided for in these statutes may be made by life insurance
companies in approximately one-half of the states, under the former statute, and sixteen
under the latter.
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type of major outlets, investments in stock or real estate are limited to a small
percent of total assets and many restrictions are placed on individual invest-
ments within each class.38
One-half of the states do not permit any investment by life insurance com-
panies in common stocks, and one-third forbid purchase of preferred shares.20
In those jurisdictions which do permit the purchase of stock, the kinds of
restrictions imposed are similar to those which limit investment in corporate
bonds and debentures.40 As applied to shares of stock, however, these re-
quirements are more stringent, and always include earnings and dividend
records of excellent stability.41
38. Common stocks: One of the most controversial of all classes of life insurance
investment, stocks were found by the Armstrong Committee to be "fundamentally ob-
jectionable" as life insurance company investments. Armstrong Report, op. cit. mupra note
4, at vol. X, 389. The TNEC failed to accept a recommendation by its special investiga-
tors that wider investments in stocks be advocated. TNEC Monograph 28, 372-8. Final
Report and Recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Committee, Sm;. Dc.
No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1941) (hereinafter cited as TNEC FL'rAL Rizro.rr).
The nation's life insurance companies strenuously opposed this recommendation. TNEC
Monograph 28-A, 4. Numerous economists, life insurance officials, and governmental
officers have participated in the controversy. HOBBS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 29. Edmunds,
supra note 21 at 418-9, 426-7. See Rose, The Policyholders Interest in Equity Invest-
inents, address by Dwight C. Rose, president of the Investment Counsel Association of
America, before thirty-fourth annual meeting of American Life Conference (reprinted
in TNEC Monograph 28-A, 32). For an early writer's view that investment in stocks
should be permitted, see ZA RmAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 184. See also note E0 inrra.
Real estate-due to the unfortunate experiences of many insurance companies-as
well as other investors-with real estate as a result of land price fluctuations, a definite
prejudice has also existed against life company investment in real estate. ZAnr%.., op.
cit. supra note 1, at 157-60, HoBs, op. cit. supra note 9, at 13; Armstrong Report, op.
cit. supra n. 4, at vol. X, 382-4. The pressure of expanding assets has tempered this policy
in recent years. See page 1266 in!fra.
39. The purchase of Canadian corporate stocks is permitted in approximately one-
third of the states, either by express inclusion of Canadian corporations in the provisions
dealing with stock or by omission from the statute of any mention of any country.
40. See pp. 1262-63 supra and notes 32-35.
41. The tests applied to earnings require that net earnings average over a given
prior period, generally five years or more, a certain percentage of the value of all out-
standing stock, usually between 4 and 12 percent. Frequent tests for preferred stock re-
quire the ratio of net earnings to the sum of total fixed charges plus maximum preferred
dividends to have equalled one and one-half to two and one-half over a similar period. A
third type of requirement judges soundness in the light of past dividend payments during
a prior period, requiring the prescribed dividend to have been paid on preferred stock, and
dividends varying from 4 to 6 percent on common stock. There are, of course, many
variations upon these major types.
Standards often applied to the issuing corporation may require that it be at least
5 years old, have a surplus greater than 50 percent of its capital stock, be solvent, and that
its interest-bearing obligations be eligible for insurance company purchase. Less severe
standards regarding railroad and public utility securities are found.
Most important are the limitations, varying between 5 and 10 per cent, upon the per-
centage of total assets which may be invested in stocks. Also common are provisions limit-
ing the percentage of the assets which may be invested in one corporation.
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When the subject of life insurance company investment is land, a hierarchy
of restrictions is encountered depending on the purpose of ownership
42
Ownership of real estate necessary for a homie office, or for the transaction of
a company's business is authorized by all states.43 And the acquisition of real
estate through foreclosure of mortgages or in satisfaction of debts is also
generally permitted although realty so acquired mdst be disposed of within
a given period of years.
44
About one-third of the states 45 approve investment of life insurance funds
in real estate for the purpose of constructing housing and redevelopment
projects.46 But the proportion of total insurance assets which may be so in-
vested is usually limited to ten or twenty percent.47 Apart from a general
ban on the construction of hotels few other restrictions are imposed upon the
acquisition of real property for this purpose.
48
Wholly separate from any powers related specifically to housing projects,
realty ownership for the purpose of leasing to business concerns or to in-
dividuals for residential use,40 has recently become authorized as an outlet
42. A summary of the statutes of each state dealing with life insurance company
ownership of real estate may be found in Analysis of StateLaws Affecting Investments
in Real Estate by Life Insurance Companies (1947) (prepared by the Life Insurance As-
sociation of America).
43. Ownership of real estate necessary for business purposes or acquired in the ordi-
nary course of business, has always been authorized for life insurance companies; but the
amount that may be so invested is often limited, varying among the states from 5 to 25%.
See Hobbs, op. cit. supra note 9, at 11-17 for a detailed description of the statutes re-
lating to real estate under this heading.
44. The period is usually 5 years, though the insurance commissioner is generally
given power to extend this period if the company would suffer by a forced sale.
45. Including all states within which the 10 largest companies are domiciled: Connec-
icut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
46. Though life insurance entrance into this field has been recent, such investments
are of great importance to both the companies and the communities benefited. Edmunds,
supra note 21, at 421-3 presents a careful analysis of the investment aspects of housing
projects, from the point of view of life insurance companies, emphasizing the difficulty
that smaller companies face in attempting to enter this field.
47. These provisions take various forms. Five states limit the total amount that may
be invested in all housing projects, to 5 or 10% of assets. Others limit the total
real estate investment only, specifying between 10 and 20%.
48. The statutes generally authorize construction of "housing projects," "tenements,"
and "apartments." Occasionally, these projects are required to be in or close to cities of
a certain minimum population, ranging from 50,000 to 100,000.
In addition to the authorization of direct project construction, two-thirds of the
states authorize the purchase of bonds of local public housing authorities issued pursuant
to assistance contracts with the Federal Public Housing Authority, under the Federal
Public Housing Act. At least three states have also provided for the formation of re-
development companies under their own laws and have made the securities of these com-
panies eligible for life insurance companies.
49. For an excellent survey of the statutes dealing with so-called "income real estate,"
particularly *as they concern companies who seek to purchase land in foreign states, see
Satterthwaite, Investmints by Life Insurance Companies. in Income Real Estate, INs. L. J,
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for life insurance company investment in at least 40 states.P0 With the ex-
ception of prohibitions against the leasing of land for agricultural use, few
restrictions are imposed upon the type of activity which may be conducted
upon property owned under these provisions. 5' It is generally required,
however, that realty investment for leasing purposes be limited to a small
percentage of the company's assets, and that leases extend for at least ten
years.5
2
ECONOMIc ASPECTS OF REGULATION
But the statutory snare of yesteryear can hardly be expected to catch the
problem of today. While the 49 sovereigns have successfully furnished policy-
holder safety in the past by means of the existing statutes, the nation's eco-
nomic evolution not only threatens to frustrate them in this purpose in the
future, but also to produce new and more serious problems related to the
regulation of insurance company investment. Existing regulation seems in-
compatible with the capital requirements for national economic health-and,
as a corollary, for the financial security of the life insurance companies-in
that it prevents investment of the nation's largest private capital pool in
equity financing of new enterprise.
It is generally recognized that national prosperity and well-being depend
upon avoidance of cyclical depressions and the stabilization of the economy at
a level providing full employment. 3 These conditions, according to modem
771 (1947). Definitions of the type of property which may be purchased are "real estate
for production of income," "for purposes of leasing," "business or residential property for
leasing." See also Levis v. New York Life Insurance Company, 358 Pa. 57, 55 A2d 801
(1947) (upholding constitutionaliy of Pennsylvania income real estate statute).
50. Primary impetus for this legislation arises from the pressing need for new invest-
ment outlets. Though such properties present opportunities for highly satisfactory in-
vestments the lessees must be chosen with care to insure full utilization of the property
Edmunds, .upra note 21, at 423. See N.Y. Times, April 11, 1948, Sec. 8, p. 2, col. 6-7. At
present, most investments of this type appear to have been confined to commercial, rather
than industrial or residential, properties.
51. Hotels, mining, and recreational properties are prohibited in various provisions.
Several states also impose a value write-dowm requirement, generally at 25 per year.
The extent to which insurers doing an interstate business are subject to the invest-
ment laws of states other than their domicile, discussed in note 13 .spra, is increased with
regard to income real estate. Sixteen states which do not otherwtise impose their invest-
ment statutes upon foreign life insurance companies nonetheless require that real estate
within those states be held by foreign insurers only in accordance with the restrictions
applied to their domestic companies. Satterthwaite, supra note 49, at 342.
52. With very few exceptions, investments in income real estate are limited to 5 or
107 of total assets. The limit upon the amount which may be invested in one parcel
of income real estate, found in a number of jurisdictions, generally varies between 4%G
and %.
53. See the Declaration of Policy in Full Employment Act of 1946, § 2, 60 STAT. 23
(1946), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1021 (Supp. 1947) ; Address by President Roosevelt at Soldier's
Field, Chicago, Illinois, Oct. 28, 1944, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1944, p. 1, col. 1; Couzcm
oF Economic ADvism.s, FIRST ANxnuA. REoar ro Tnm Pnnmm," 2, 8-18 (1946);
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economists, depend in turn on the continuous creation of new business ac-
tivity,54 which requires that private savings withdrawn from the national in-
come stream be promptly returned to productive uses.5
In past decades even within the limited area allowed by regulatory laws, it
was possible to keep life insurance funds invested in a way conducive to the
necessary business expansion. A young nation busily waging the industrial
revolution could satisfactorily place its relatively smaller insurance company
funds in railroad and utility bonds-and to a lesser degree in high-grade in-
dustrial bonds. But the great increase in insurance funds,16 together with
a decline in the flotation of quality bonds have rendered the traditional outlets
of investment increasingly inadequate.57
Between 1936 and 1946, for example, life insurance companies accumulated
twenty-four billion dollars in new assets,58 while the total amount of private
debt outstanding in the nation remained essentially constant.O The only large
outlet for these funds was federal obligations which increased throughout the
period.6° While the wide-scale industrial reconversion of the post-war period
provided enough debt outlets to absorb new funds received during the past two
Neifeld, The Choice before Institutional Investors, 79 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 159; and
treatises cited in note 4 supra.
This discussion analyses the economic importance of a life insurance business based
upon the existing net-level-premium, legal reserve theory, the fundamental basis of which
is investment of policyholder premiums. Alternative theories of life insurance operation,
based upon a pay-as-you-go or strictly risk spreading principle, and eliminating the need
for investment of savings, might relieve the problems raised herein, but are not con-
sidered in this treatment.
54. The economy can be maintained upon an even keel only if pressures toward con-
traction of the level of economic activity are constantly resisted and overcome by stronger
stimuli toward expansion-stimuli which result from the promotion of new activity. For
further discussion on the importance to the economy of the rate at which new business
activity is stimulated see EcoNomic REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT Part I, cc. 1, 4 (1948) ;
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936); Ezic-
IEL, JOBS FOR ALL THROUGH INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION (1939). See notes 4, 53 supra.
55. TNEC Monograph 37, 5-10, 49-50; KEYNES, op. cit. supra note 54. For discussion
of the importance of life insurance funds in the total flow of savings, see TNEC Mono-
graph 37, at 35-50; Geren, The Contribution of Life Insurance to the Savings Stream,
51 J. POL. EcoN. 33 (1943).
56. Edmunds, mipra note 21, at 410; Huntington, Response of Life Insurance Funds to
the Nation's Demand for Funds, ASSOCIATION OF LIFE INSURANCE PRESIDENTS, PROCEED-
iNGS 21 (19th annual meeting, 1947) ; LIAA, PROCEEDINGS, 49, Table I (1947) ; Fortune,
April, 1948, p. 109.
57. TNEC Monograph 28, 360-3. TNEC Monograph 37, 42-50.
58. LIFE INSURANCE AssocIATioN PROCEEDINGS, Op. cit. supra note 57 at 50, Table I.
Inasmuch as total assets at the start of this period were $24,874,316,000, these companies
thus doubled in size in the ten year period. See also note 5, supra.
59. Edmunds, supra note 21, at 412, Exhibit II. The relative decline in long-term
private debt was emphasized by TNEC Monograph 37, at 42, and was a chronic
feature of the United States capital scene from 1932 through 1945. During this thirteen
year period, the total increase in life insurance assets was 28 billion dollars.
60. See note 18 supra. TNEC Monograph 28, 364, 374.
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years,61 it is probable that the future annual demand for debt capital by gov-
ernmental and business units will not again be adequate to absorb the rapidly
growing body of life insurance capital.02
Several factors inherent in the types of new activity needed in future
American economic development prevent them from being financed by the
traditional debt methods required by life insurance companies. At the
outset, it is clear that the major economic need is for capital promotion of new
industrial and commercial enterprises.0 3 With a higher national income and
standard of living, a greater net share of national production must be diverted
to complex consumer goods and services.04 The rate of capital obsolescence will
be greatly increased by the development of the types of new products and
resources in which expansion is most likely to occur.05 The difficulty of as-
certaining degrees of risk will be increased as intensive industrialization de-
velops products requiring longer periods of exploration, development, accumu-
lation of materials, manufacture and market building. The capital re-
quired will be greater and less secure as production tends to new items
probably representing less value in form of natural resources or salvageable
components.66 Finally, as the rate of population increase levels off, initial
estimates of demand and consumption become increasingly critical, for a
bountiful increase in population can no longer be counted upon to rescue en-
terprise out of scale with initial demand." While to some extent these inhibi-
tions to debt financing might be avoided if new ventures were undertaken as
extensions of existing corporations of secure financial status, such a practice
61. LIAA, PROCEEDINGs 42-7. For the first time since 1930, holdings of United
States governments decreased, and holdings of corporate securities and mortgages in-
creased. Ibid.
62. See Edmunds, op. cit. supra note 21, at 413-14; Fortune, April, 1943, p. 169. A
projection of the past rate of increase of life insurance assets reveals that the 3y billions
which life insurance companies received for investment during 1947 will have swollen to
a yearly increase of about 4y billion dollars in 5 years, and of about 6 billion dollars in
10 years. It does not appear that the amount of secured obligations available for pur-
chase will increase at such a rate. See also notes 58 supra, and 88 infra.
63. See note 54 supra and TNEC FRN.A REFPOR', at 15-6, 30-1; Eco:omic Rnu.o-s
OF THE PRESMENT, pt. 1, 59 (1947).
64. EcoNomic REPORTS OF THE PRESMD-W, pt. I, 56-86; pt. II, 34-47 (1947). Ed-
munds, supra note 21, at 409-10.
65. A more rapid rate of development of new products necessitates an equally rapid
abandonment of old capital investments in favor of new capital facilities. Far greater
emphasis upon consumers' goods and services increases the subjection of the nation's pro-
ductive plant to changes in consumer demand, for consumer favor and sales technique
become the masters of investment flow. See Caplan, Premature Abandonment and the
Flow of Investment, 54 Q. J. EcoN. 152 (1939).
66. The man-made contribution to capital formation, and the importance of managerial
and engineering vision and foresight must be relatively greater than the contribution of
physical materials. Edmunds, supra note 21, at 410.
67. See Hauser and Toeuber, The Changing Population of the United Slates, 237
AwNAI.s 12 (1945); REDDA.WAY, THE EcoNomucs OF A DE UaING PoPuLATo: 117-19
(1939).
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would have the undesirable result of increasing centralization of economic
power s by denying new corporate ventures access to the vast life insurance
funds as a source of necessary capital.
But even if new enterprises and existing corporate ventures could make the
showing required for life insurance debt investment, basic disadvantages in
this capital form would prevent it from furnishing a satisfactory method of
utilizing life insurance funds to expand the level of business activity. The as-
sumption of large fixed debt charges frequently prevents the most economic
operation of the nation's productive plant. 9 The premature precipitation of
bankruptcy or reorganization which may result from an unsound debt ratio
not only causes wide-spread disruption of industrial plant,70 and disintegration
of general business morale, but also may force the withdrawal from production
of business units which economically speaking should remain active.71 For
as long as the value of the goods produced by a business exceeds the prime
costs of production, a net increase in total wealth is effected, and the economy
suffers when the producing unit is forced into bankruptcy because of inability
to meet interest requirements.7 2 Even when current prime production costs
exceed value of current production, bankruptcy may be premature if long-run
earnings would be satisfactory, despite a few lean years. 3
68. See TNEC FINAL REPORT, § I (1941) for an analysis of the problems of eco-
nomic concentration; also message from President Roosevelt to the Congress, April 29,
1938, 83 CONG. REc. 5992 (1938). Cf. p. 1274 infra.
69. For suggestions by various commentators that one of the greatest disadvantages of
the preeminence of life insurance companies in capital markets has been that the tre-
mendous "appetite" of these. companies for fixed interest investment has tempted, borrow-
ing corporations into unsound financial structures, see Edmunds, supra note 21, at 414;
TNEC Monograph 28, 373; Fortune, April, 1948, p. 109.
70. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, Dasrs AND REcOVERY 232, c. 6 (1938) ; BALLANTINE,
CoRoRiTIoNs 495 (1946); 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLCY OF Coaoam.ioxs 261-2 (4th
ed. 1941).
71. See R. F. Harrod, The Expansion of Credit in an Advancing Continoty, 1 Eco-
NomicA (n.s.) 287, 289-90 (1934). Actual operation of the enterprise may continue
throughout and after the reorganization or bankruptcy. But where the insurance coin-
panies inherit the enterprise through their position as senior security holders, manage-
ment may be seriously disrupted. See note 84 infra.
72. ". . . ideally the whole ownership of fixed means of production ought to be of
the 'equity' form. For it is economically sound that fixed means should continue to be
exploited, so long as the value of the product exceeds the prime costs. The existence of
fixed money charges brings the operation of firms to a premature end, if and when the
value of the product, while exceeding prime costs, does not exceed them sufficiently to
meet the fixed charges." Id., at 289. See also BOULDiNG, ECONOmIC ANALYSIS e. 21
(1941).
73. An additional consideration of practical significance arises with respect to those
enterprises, such as service industries, whose success depends largely upon public favor
and acceptance. The withdrawal from active competition of such a business may well
mean its permanent death, through loss of its position of prominence and favor. Thus, tile
future of such enterprises may warrant their continuation during periods of development
or depression in spite of operating losses.
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Moreover, by disregard of the industry's ability to pay, the necessity of
meeting fixed interest requirements often gives rise to unsound operating
practices. In particular, management policies may be affected with regard to
depreciation allowances, ploughed back earnings, maintenance, research and
reserves.
74
The disadvantages of excessive debt financing are particularly great in the
case of new enterprises. Because no record of past operations is available
upon which estimates of probable future earnings may be based, it is almost
impossible to estimate a fixed debt which the company may safely attempt.
Moreover, in actual operation of thenew venture, lean years and unpredictable
difficulties are more likely to arise. Coupled with the new venture's usual in-
ability to raise additional capital in time of stress, assumption of a large fixed
debt seriously lessens its ability to withstand business difficulties.7
The life insurance companies themselves would benefit from use of their
funds as equity capital in the financing of new business expansion. To the
degree that such investment improves the economic health of the nation it
would increase the actual security of life insurance companies, for the best
and probably only effective guarantee of the safety of life insurance invest-
ments is a stable economy, whether the contractual terms of the investment
give a "creditor's" or "owner's" interest. Although they suffered some losses,70
the better managed life insurance companies weathered the 1929 crash. But
today, the great magnitude and broad placement of life insurance funds within
the economy make it extremely questionable that in a more serious depression,
destroying the ability of a large portion of the nation's enterprises to produce,
a fifty-one billion dollar island of security and stability could remain.7
74. Experience with the nation's railroads provides perhaps the clearest object lesson
of the managerial dilemma which results from excessive fixed charges. Ifoore, Railroad
Fixed Charges in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 47 J. PoL. Ecox. 100 (1939) ; see also BouLD-
ING, op. cit. supra note 72, c. 31; and TNEC Monograph 28, 377, n. 190.
75. See Masslich, Financing a New Corporate Enterprise, 5 IL. L. REV. 70 (1910).
"Many a corporation defaults on its bond interest during a temporary depression and ends
its career in a receivership, when if its capitalization had been represented by fewer bonds
and more stock it could have passed the stock dividend and weathered the storm.' Id. at
72. See also authorities cited in note 70 mtpra.
76. From 1930 through 1934, the total loss suffered by the chief life insurance com-
panies on investments other than mortgages was about 583 million dollars. TvENm
CENuY FuND, DEBTs AND RFcovax 31-2, 286 (1938) ; the net loss on bonds and stacks
over the 1929-1938 period was $483,000,000. TNEC Monograph 28, 363. No important
company failed in this period. However, of 101 life insurance companies which discon-
tinued operation between 1930 and 1939 as a result of merger, receivership or reinsurance,
39 were failures the retirement of which resulted in a loss to policy holders. 19 of these
brought initial policyholder losses of one million dollars or more, or a total initial loss of
138 million dollars, much of which has since been recouped through assumption of liabili-
ties by other companies. See TNEC Monograph 28, 131; TNEC Monograph 28-A, 5.
77. Life insurance companies hold about 30 percent of the nation's total long term
debt. FoRTuNE, supra note 63. The 51 and one-half billion dollars of investments held by
these companies, representing about 15 per cent of total estimated national wealth, would
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Similarly it is to the best interest of the life insurance companies that the
economy be free from the undesirable effects of the present over-emphasis
upon debt financing. In addition to their general interest in the national finan-
cial soundness, certainly life insurance companies have direct interest in the
soundness of the particular enterprises in which they have invested, and in
preventing both the undue pressures on management and unnecessary bank-
ruptcy which result from excessive fixed debt.
An even more immediate consequence to life insurance companies of the
current restrictive statutes is the present critical lack of insurance investment
outlets. The ability to invest is the fundamental basis of all present private life
insurance operation.78 The limited supply of "high quality" investment oppor-
tunities has already created grave problems for life insurance companies, one
of the most important of which is the recent decline in interest return to a
point uncomfortably close to the minimum guaranteed in policy contracts1 9
But do new enterprises present a sufficiently safe investment for life in-
surance companies? Such a program would unavoidably involve some increase
in risk,80 but the life insurance companies seem excellently situated for mini-
appear to bind life insurance welfare inextricably to the national economic welfare, in-
cluding its stability and security.
78. HUEBNER, Op. cit. supra note 6, at pt. 2, (1935); see generally, HUENER A14D
McCAHAN, LIFE INSURANCE AS INVESTMENT (1933). See mention of possible alternative
theories of life insurance operation in note 53 supra.
79. LIAA, PROCEEDINGS 45-47 (1947) ; TNEC Monograph 28, at 368-71. Net invest-
ment earnings have steadily dropped sifice 1930, and dropped below 3 percent for the first
time during 1946. Total net investment earnings in 1946 were almost one billion dollars
less than they would have been at the 1930 earnings rate level.
80. An increase in risk would result primarily from the nature of the investments
advocated; expansion into new fields, promotion of untried enterprises; development of as
yet unfamiliar products.
However, this risk should not be confused with the risk which some legislators have
thought to be inherent in crossing the forbidden barrier from debt to equity capital. See
note 37 supra. Relinquishment of the equity cushion which protects debt investment
theoretically means greater loss, when failure occurs. TNEC Monograph 28-A, 4. How-
ever, on the record the aggregate return from equity investments, the total number of
failures, and the extent of loss indicate that a policy of equity investment would probably
be as favorable to life insurance companies as the present investment pattern, if conducted
on a comparable scale.
The legal incidents of "owner" and "creditor" interests are in many instances identical.
For example, neither interest on income bonds nor dividend claims should be considered
to constitute a "debt," since neither form the basis of an action against the issuer for non-
payment And many stock issues share with bonds a lack of voting voice in company
meetings. The real difference is one of priority of claims, both on principal and income.
In general, secured and unsecured interest claims have a claim prior to that of any other
invested capital, and in the event of reorganization or bankruptcy, this priority not only
gives "creditors" greater security, but also a large degree of control over the debtor
corporation. See address by Dwight C. Rose, op. cit. supra note 38; Phelps, Stocks for
Life Insurance Companies, 146 COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CiiRONICLn 483 (1946);
Neifeld, The Choice before Institutional Investors, 79 TRUSTS AND ESTAATES 159 (1944) ;
Dissent by Commissioner Frank in North American Company, SEC Holding Co. Act Re-
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mizing the danger. They have long-term capital; and the vast size of their
resources would enable them to retain the finest research, analytical and man-
agerial talent. By the size of the funds involved, the companies would be able
to spread their interests widely so that failure in one particular venture could
be offset by success elsewhere, and some variety of inter-company insurance
might be developed similar to the cross-insurance techniques developed to
protect fire and casualty companies from disaster losses at present. Moreover,
careful equity investment in new enterprise would probably not increase the
injury to life insurance companies from even a nationwide recession, for the
long-run record of American business is sufficiently successful to balance de-
pression losses by increased returns in periods of prosperity.8 ' The economy
has certainly not yet stagnated to the point where it is no longer possible to
establish new sound and profitable businesses.
OBSTACLES To EASy SOLUTION
Although the diversion of life insurance investment into equity capital
seems necessary for the welfare of the national economy as well as of the
insurance companies, any development along these lines appears to raise pro-
hibitive legal problems. The main legal task of arranging such a shift would
be replacement of present investment statutes.8 2 But once life insurance funds
began to flow into equity capital, the problem of protecting the policyholder
from risk of financial loss and the public from the dangers of monopolistic
control appears to lead to government intervention to a startling degree.
At the outset it appears that life insurance companies could not safely en-
trust any large amount of their funds to equity capital without exercising
managerial control over the businesses in which they invest. Safety to the
policyholder under present insurance investment lies theoretically in security
pledged behind a debt, a tangible res of high value, requiring no managerial J
control for its preservation.8s In contrast, the security behind equity financing
lease No. 1427, January 30, 1939; TwETiEr-H Cm\.-runy FuND, Dsnrs AN Rscovm- 255
(1938).
81. Absolute absence of risk cannot be obtained from any type of investment. Noth-
ing like such perfection has been achieved with security loans, see note 76 supra, particularly
where the amount of investment is so large that its success must vary with the health of
the economy as a whole. Yet careful calculation of premiums, conservative interest rate
guarantees in policies, even more conservative mortality assumptions, and the maintenance
of adequate reserves have enabled the nation's life insurance business to maintain a re-
markable record of solvency. The same techniques, however, could be applied to invest-
ments in new enterprises. See Edmunds, supra note 21 at 416.
82. Since the South-Eastcn Underwriters case, there is no question of Congressional
power to take such action. See note 10 supra. Compare TNEC, Fnx.AL R~rarrr 587-90
with TNEC Monograph 28-A, at 20-1.
83. See Edmunds, supra note 21, at 414, 416. Huebner, op. cit. supra note 6, at c. 33;
ZARTSAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 151, 178. For a suggestion that life insurance company
managements lack vital managerial and promotional experience--the very essence of suc-
cess in a business enterprise-see Edmunds, supra note 21, at 425, 427. And life insurance
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would be mainly the "going concern" value of the enterprise. Especially in the
types of new enterprises most likely to be developed, rarely would the venture
have great salvage value or large fixed assets to cover insurance investments
should the company fail.84 Lacking the criteria of past performance which
are so useful in evaluating the securities of well-established companies, life
insurance companies would have only such factors as the quality of manage-
ment and soundness of initial organization as their guarantees of probable suc-
cess of a new venture.8 5 Moreover, the large fluctuations in value which char-
acterize equity interests in most corporate enterprises, and the increased risk
of great losses from unwise management policy, would make it imperative that
insurance companies supervise management in order to protect their invested
interest.
8 6
Traditional governmental responsibilities of policyholder protection thus
probably could not be satisfied by a simple body of law restricting insurance
investment from areas which seem dangerous. If the present body of statutory
restrictions were abandoned, government protection of policyholders from
the risks of insurance company investment in equity capital would probably
lead to a degree of supervision approaching the stature of a partnership be-
tween the government and the insurance companies in exercising control over
industries receiving life insurance funds. The importance of extreme delibera-
tion and care in the planning and initial organization of business enterprises
would necessitate great participation by government in original investment
decisions. Moreover, since the safety of direct investment in enterprises rests
on the wisdom with which the business is operated throughout its existence,
adequate policyholder protection would require the government continuously
to scrutinize those management policies which the insurance companies had
approved.
But there would be an even more compelling cause for government inter-
vention, both in life insurance investment policies and in the enterprises so
controlled. For life insurance company control of enterprises would raise a
great anti-trust danger; the result could be an unprecedented integration of
American industry. So vast are the insurance company investments that the
officials have sought to avoid participation in management of companies in which they
invested. TNEC Monograph 28, at 373, n. 179.
84. BALLANTINE op. cit. supra note 70, at 499. The financial losses attendant upon
failure of a corporate enterprise are already well-known to life insurance companies. Be-
tween 1929 and 1938, these companies wrote off $624,153,000 of their investments, as a
result of bond defaults. TNEC Monograph 28, at 363. See also Investaations of Rail-
roads, Holding Companies, and ,4ffiliated Companies pursnant to S. Res. 71, SEU. Rl,. No.
25, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 81 (1939).
85. The heavy reliance by the investment statutes upon past record of corporate en-
terprises, as the basis for sound investment, has already been stated. See note 33 supra.
The extent to which this factor also influences life insurance company investment officials
is shown in TNEC 28, at 359-63, 375.
86. Tracy, The Problem of Granting Voting Rights to Bondholders, 2 U. oF Cut L.
Rzv. 208 (1935) ; BALLANTiNE, op. cit. supra note 70, at 498.
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total of new investments in 1947 would build two railroads the size of the
Pennsylvania Railroad, or an automobile industry the size of General Motors
and the Ford Motor Company combined.8 7 The six billion dollars per year
which life insurance companies will probably be receiving in new funds in
1958 would rebuild the entire Bell Telephone system, or three steel companies
the size of the United States Steel Corporation."8 Moreover, in addition to
these annual increments to total assets, the companies annually have available
funds from maturing past investments that currently may be as much as two
billion dollars. sm And the problem is not only one of the size of insurance
funds; it arises also from the high degree of cooperation and joint action
characteristic of American insurance.0° This cooperation is not only desirable,
but would appear unavoidable if life insurance companies were to invest in
equity or venture capital, for it would allow a splitting of enterprise risks
among insurance companies so that the failure of any one enterprise would
not seriously weaken any one company.
CONCLUSION
Public interest in the vast economic resources of insurance companies is
not new. In 1906 the Armstrong investigation in New York State suggested
that the happy optimism of insurance company officials over the expansion of
insurance funds might be described as unwitting pride in the growth of a
monster.91 In 1938, the TNEC's similar though more extensive investigation
produced similar diagnosis. 2 But the economic dynamics of the problem-
that the areas into which national economic health and insurance company
security would force insurance funds greatly magnify the legal problems of
safeguarding public and policyholder interest-have been slighted.
It seems highly desirable that a further government study be made with
special emphasis on the economic aspects of insurance investment. While no
easy answer appears, it is possible that by taking action before the situation
becomes critical an escape from the dilemma may be found. Absent a satis-
factory solution, the addition of economic depression or unsettled political con-
ditions to the unsolved problem would seem a sure formula for producing ill-
advised and drastic action.
87. MfooDy's MfAxuAL or INVESUMENTS, INDUShAL s (1943).
88. Ibid.
89. Edmunds, =pra note 21, at 411.
90. Intercompany cooperation and agreements e.dst to an unusually high degree in
the insurance business. TNEC Monograph 28, c. 10.
91. See note 4 supra.
92. See note 2 supra.
